INTRODUCTION EMERGING LOCAL OPERATORS IN SHARED SPECTRUM
Over the last few years, mobile and nomadic broadband access has achieved tremendous success. Innovation in mobile handsets (e.g., smartphones and tablets) has caused a virtual data tsunami, leading to severe capacity problems for many operators. The dramatic surge in traffic is expected to continue in upcoming years. Since the majority of the traffic is likely to be generated inside buildings, significant investment in indoor network deployment is foreseen. Some of the investment will be made by incumbent mobile network operators (MNOs) for deploying heterogeneous networks. Another type of investment, which is the focus of this article, will be provided by new market actors, such as facility managers, real estate owners, and private companies [1] . The main driver for them is to deploy and operate dedicated networks for wireless Internet access inside their buildings to increase their attractiveness to tenants or customers (e.g., hotels or office space providers). The private networks may also serve those MNO customers that happen to be in the buildings (i.e. provide offloading). This is a business model similar to the one seen in current fixed network access: public operators provide connection to buildings, whereas in-building networks are deployed and managed by the facility owners. An additional problem compared to fixed network access is that such local operators 1 do not have their own dedicated spectrum. One possible solution is using shared spectrum, where the sharing takes place between neighboring indoor operators.
REGULATORY TRENDS IN SHARED SPECTRUM
There are regulatory initiatives worldwide aiming to promote shared access to new spectrum for fostering more competition and innovation in a wireless access market. The national regulators of Sweden and the Netherlands recently announced that a portion of the spectrum around 1800 MHz was opened for cellular technologies with indoor usage in an unlicensed or a preregistration manner [2, 3] . In the United Kingdom, 1781.7-1785 MHz paired with 1876.7-1880 MHz band was allocated to 12 operators with shared licenses in 2006 for low-power indoor networks [4] . The light licensing of nationwide 3650-3700 MHz was also adopted by the United States in 2007 [4] . An overview of regulatory initiatives can be found in [5, 6] .
CONTRIBUTION OF THIS ARTICLE
Local wireless access operation in shared spectrum presents new research challenges from a techno-economic perspective. In this article, we provide an analysis framework that effectively navigates and compares potential deployment strategies of the operators. We define a strategy space that integrates technology and business aspects. Then a legacy cost model for a single operator is reformulated by introducing new inter-operator cost factors. The validity of our framework is demonstrated by numerical com-
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parisons of selected strategies in a two-operator example. Finally, we outline important research areas to be addressed for future studies.
DEPLOYMENT CHALLENGES FOR HIGH CAPACITY WIFI MAY NOT BE ENOUGH IN UPCOMING YEARS
The local operators certainly need a low-cost system to provide high-capacity services in the new shared spectrum. WiFi naturally seems the first candidate because a substantial amount of indoor traffic is already offloaded to WiFi in an industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) band. However, it has been reported that WiFi may not cope with very large traffic loads due to the "performance wall" caused by the underlying carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) mechanism [7] . In these situations, we need to consider cellular-type systems with interference coordination capabilities.
TRADE-OFF IN INTERFERENCE MANAGEMENT OPTIONS
In shared spectrum, interference management between adjacent operators is one of the key issues. The easiest option would be not to cooperate with neighbors. However, this may inflict mutual interference, which may in turn lead to poor performance. Alternatively, a cellular technology developed in a single operator context can be applied. The simplest form would be traditional interference avoidance techniques with static resource partitioning (e.g., frequency planning), which, however, comes at a significant performance loss. More advanced techniques (e.g., interference cancellation, joint multicell processing, or coordinated scheduling) can be further exploited to enhance system capacity.
Improvement in technical performance is obviously expected from tighter interference coordination. However, additional cost and various business constraints are the hidden barriers that should not be overlooked. The coordination may require better infrastructure and extra network resources for reliable information exchange, which incurs a higher cost. Furthermore, a strategic cooperation agreement in a business domain needs to be made for the interoperator coordination. An operator may be limited in his/her business strategies due to forming an alliance with its neighbor because he/she may lose competitive advantages by limitations in network operation and network upgrades [8, 9] .
NEED FOR A TECHNO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
As summarized in Table 1 , the system design in shared spectrum is inherently a multidimensional problem where technology, business, and regulatory issues are intertwined. The problem of choosing an operator strategy brings up several research challenges that have rarely been addressed in the literature. First, the analysis of operator-wise competition or cooperation is nontrivial due to the business complexity involved, although competition between individual users inside a network has been extensively studied [10] . Second, the operators need to be able to compare different levels of technical coordination in addition to their associated business complexity. There is a lack of systematic evaluation methodology for this. Third, a proper cost model should be in place for a cost-performance trade-off analysis. There are some attempts to model the network cost of a conven- tional single operator network [11] . However, the cost model in a multi-operator context has not been covered yet.
DEFINING THE SOLUTION SPACE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A fundamental network design problem that the operators face is minimizing their total network cost while satisfying their users' demands. In order to achieve this, the cost of different deployment options should be compared with respect to the performance (e.g., capacity) requirement. This comparison becomes more complicated in a shared spectrum environment because both cost and performance are heavily affected by neighboring operators. Since cooperation intrinsically involves strategic decisions in the business domain, a means to assess the combined effects of a technology choice and business aspects is needed. In this section, we provide a conceptual framework to effectively categorize potential strategies. As shown in Fig. 1 , various operator strategies are characterized on one hand by the strategic decision of the operators, i.e., cooperation and competition, and on the other hand by the technical solution expressed as the level of coordination.
STRATEGIC DECISION: COOPERATION OR COMPETITION
The strategic decision in the business domain influences the way neighboring networks are coordinated. In this article, we model cooperation and competition by using different technical objective functions that each operator aims to maximize. The two types of strategies are:
• Cooperation: The operators aim at maximizing a common objective function agreed between them.
• Competition: Each operator aims at maximizing its own objective function in a selfish manner.
Cooperating operators who synchronize their technical behaviors form a network alliance. Reaching an agreement on a common objective function is in itself challenging, particularly when the partners have chosen different criteria for their quality of service (QoS), for example, a guaranteed-rate video service vs. a best effort service. From a radio resource allocation perspective, the network alliance behaves as a conventional single-operator network. The coordination issues turn into a problem of internal resource management for the combined network.
Competition between the operators requires a non-traditional system design. Regulators must provide guidelines for operator behavior by issuing coexistence rules ("etiquettes"), which can coordinate the network rivalry to some extent. For the case of network-wise competition, internetwork interference is coupled with intranetwork interference control, which creates new challenges.
TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS: COORDINATION BETWEEN NETWORKS
The technical solutions of the operators implementing their strategic decisions directly affect the network's performance. We define coordination in a technical domain as the process of sharing relevant information. The level of coordination is measured by the amount of information shared in the process. The information relevant to the interference coordination can be statistical or instantaneous traffic load, or path gains between all the involved access points (APs) and user terminals, usually referred to as channel state information (CSI).
More accurate and frequent information exchange increases the global knowledge of the whole system. A system with complete information sharing can be interpreted as a centralized network (whether decisions are made centrally or not). Such a system is desirable from a performance perspective since it can provide realtime resource allocation (e.g., beamforming or coordinated scheduling [12] ). On the other hand, only slow-varying information (average propagation conditions and the number of users per cell) might be shared. This requires considerably less sophisticated equipment, and the information may be exchanged using existing IP connections.
SHARED SPECTRUM COST MODEL
Recall that the network design objective is to find the operator's strategy that enables them to offer the lowest total cost for the required capacity. The cost in a shared spectrum environment has an additional element with regard to technical inter-operator relations. In addition, there is "strategic cost" representing the business uncertainty caused by the decision to cooperate. In this section, we recap a traditional single-operator cost model, and highlight new inter-operator cost items.
TRADITIONAL SINGLE-OPERATOR COST MODEL
For a legacy operator in a wide area, the cost of a wireless network mainly consists of two parts, infrastructure and spectrum, as described in [11] : C tot = C infra + C spectrum = NC r + WC w (1) where N and C r are the number of deployed APs and the normalized cost per AP (€/AP), respectively. W represents the allocated spectrum (MHz), and C w the cost per unit of spectrum (€/MHz). Here, C r includes all capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operational expenditure (OPEX) aspects. CAPEX is mostly related to all one-time investments (e.g., APs or core network equipment, site installation/buildout, and antenna systems). Cost during operation (e.g., backhaul transmission, site rental, operation and maintenance [O&M] , and electricity) is categorized as OPEX. OPEX is typically discounted to present value assuming expected annual running cost and network lifetime.
Indoor and hotspot systems may have a simpler cost structure than conventional macro networks due to the small physical size of equipment. For instance, cost related to site installation/build-out, site rental, antenna systems, and O&M may be free or ignorable, whereas expenses for the AP equipment and the new backhaul installation may be dominant. However, we can still employ a linear model as a function of the number of APs as in Eq. 1. By sharing spectrum, spectrum cost is also likely to become negligible.
INTER-OPERATOR COST IN SHARED SPECTRUM
(Invisible) Strategic Cost -Operators have traditionally been reluctant to share networks or to cooperate across business boundaries mainly due to the limitations and uncertainties they perceive regarding their marketing strategies. Cooperation takes place only if large economic gains are foreseen (e.g., mobile broadband in rural areas where a small customer base cannot support multiple parallel networks). In the business literature, such barriers against strategic alliance with competitors have been widely studied (e.g., see [13] ). Similar issues have also been discussed in [9] in the context of outdoor network sharing. Some key network-related obstacles are: • Management overhead: Decision making on network deployment/upgrade can be delayed because it requires an agreement with the cooperation partner.
• Limited network controllability: An operator may lose control over the deployment and operation of its own network, which can restrict individual network dimensioning and make its service indistinguishable from its competitors.
• Risk of information leakage: The coordination may reveal customer statistics and know-how on network optimization to the other operator.
• Lack of trust: An operator may suspect that One way for decision makers to handle uncertainty or risk is to present a risk margin when calculating the expected profits of the operation. In this article, we do this by introducing an additional fictitious cost, denoted by the strategic cost C stex . Notice that C stex may not be strictly measurable because it may be related not only to objectively computable risk but also to perceived uncertainty about the future. This is not a new concept in strategic decision making in the business domain, where one often considers an uncertainty margin, such as using a fictitious "required rate of return" or "hurdle rate" when comparing investment options [14] .
Coordination Cost -From a technical point of view, information sharing between networks requires additional complexity and infrastructure cost. The coordination cost C coord is spent for acquiring relevant information for resource allocation. Depending on the amount of information to be shared, C coord can be negligible or significant. As exemplified in Fig. 2 , the extra cost mainly emanates from installing a dedicated backhaul and/or an intermediate entity to coordinate the interference between networks. For instance, real-time interference coordination may necessitate expensive dedicated backhaul both inside and between buildings to allow for reliable low-latency information sharing. In addition, an internetwork coordinator should be put in place for fast and synchronized resource allocation. While in-building backhaul would be paid by an individual operator, the common cost (i.e., inter-building backhaul or the intermediate equipment) can be shared. In a moderate coordination scenario, each network may use its existing in-building IP connection to control its own APs. Even in this case, intermediate coordination equipment may need to be introduced by a third party due to a regulatory constraint (e.g., spectrum broker) or a trust reason in the business domain. The cost for extra coordination equipment can also be saved by directly exchanging information between neighboring operators, resulting in a distributed network architecture. In general, a lower level of coordination requires more APs to satisfy required traffic demand [7] . Thus, finding a proper level of coordination to give the lowest total cost is an important issue.
By including the two inter-operator cost factors, the total cost model of an operator in shared spectrum is extended to (2) In the following section, we demonstrate how to use our proposed techno-economic modeling approach in a typical scenario.
COMPARISON OF OPERATOR STRATEGIES TWO-BUILDING SCENARIO
Let us consider a scenario with two nearby buildings as illustrated in Fig 1. Two indoor operators without exclusive spectrum want to deploy networks in their respective buildings. We assume that the regulator has arranged a shared frequency band in order to foster such local deployments under a light licensing regime. This band only requires cost-free preregistration to avoid uncertain interference from end users. Both operators run their networks in this frequency band. In this scenario, two operators want to find the most economic deployment strategy.
CANDIDATE OPERATOR STRATEGIES
A multitude of solutions for operators can be envisaged that combine technology and business aspects. However, we choose three candidate strategies as follows for illustrative purposes.
Strategy I (no cooperation): Neither operator wants to cooperate due to the potential limitations of strategic alliance. Instead, they choose to deploy a CSMA/CA network imposed by a regulator as a coexistence mechanism unless cooperation between operators is implemented.
Strategy II (loose cooperation):
The operators decide on joint deployment of cellular technology based on a mutual contract. Although this improves network performance compared to strategy I, it increases dependence on the neighbor operator. They choose a traditional picocell system across the two buildings employing conventional frequency planning that can be implemented without further investment in infrastructure.
Strategy III (tight cooperation): The operators jointly deploy a cellular network. This time, they want to use a system with an advanced multi-cell joint processing technique, zero-forcing (ZF) coordinated beamforming, in order to have higher system capacity with fewer APs. In this strategy, they essentially need to invest in intra/inter-building optical fiber infrastructure. 
COST COMPARISON OF STRATEGIES
Evaluation Assumptions -For analysis simplicity, we assume that each local propagation condition and average traffic demand l (gigabytes per month per user) are symmetric. Two neighboring single-story buildings with the size of 50 m × 100 m accommodate 500 employees each. Wall loss of L w dB exists both inside of a building and between buildings. The CSMA/CA network assumes channel bonding (aggregation) to fully exploit available frequency range. Perfect carrier sensing without redundant idle APs is assumed to have optimistic CSMA/CA performance. Loose cooperation uses the best static frequency reuse subject to a given outage constraint. The tight cooperation assumes ideal ZF without any CSI at the transmitter (CSIT) error and feedback delay in an uncorrelated channel. Some of the important simulation parameters used are summarized as follows:
• Path loss exponent and transmission power: 3 and 20 dBm • Maximum link spectral efficiency: 6.67 b/s/Hz • System bandwidth and signal-to-interference-plus-noise (SINR) outage threshold: 60 MHz and 3 dB • Carrier sensing threshold for the CSMA/CA network: -72 dBm More detailed system modeling and simulation parameters can be found in [7] . Hereafter, the three strategies (i.e., no cooperation, loose cooperation, and tight cooperation) will be denoted by superscripts n, l, and t, respectively.
No Cooperation vs. Loose Cooperation -
We assume a unit price for an AP with no cooperation (C n r = 1) without loss of generality. Figure 3 illustrates and depending on l . The strategic cost C stex can have a heavy influence on the lowest cost strategy. If two operators are very reluctant to cooperate, C stex will be high, potentially significantly enough to prevent cooperation, as depicted by the dotted lines in Fig. 3 .
From an analysis perspective, we can quantify the condition for C stex given that N l (l)C l r + C stex ≤ N n (l)C n r . Then let us define maximum acceptable cooperation risk (MACR) for a given demand l:
This quantitatively provides us with the upper bound of risk the operators are willing to take when choosing their cooperation strategy. MACR of zero means that cooperation is worthless because C l r is already too high. On the contrary, high MACR indicates that operators need to cooperate even if they perceive a high risk of cooperation. As shown in Fig. 4 , MACR can be explicitly plotted as a function of l and C l r for a given unit cost C n r = 1 in order to aid an operator's decision making. This only requires estimating N n (l ) and N l (l ) for varying l . In this particular example, we can observe from Fig. 4 that MACR rapidly increases after a certain demand level because the CSMA/CA mechanism cannot satisfy such a high demand. This indicates that operators will have to rely on the cooperation in the end as the traffic demand continues to grow.
Loose Cooperation vs. Tight Cooperation
-Tight cooperation additionally incurs the cost of fiber installation between all APs (or remote radio head) and a central baseband processor. Let C fiber denote the fiber installation cost per AP. Then, unlike C stex , C coord is assumed to be approximately linear to the number of placed APs: C coord = N t (l) C fiber . We assume the costs for the central processor and inter-building fiber are relatively negligible and C stex is same for both strategies. Then we can assess the condition for C fiber . Similar to the MACR, let us define break-even fiber cost (BEFC) per AP:
where represents coordination efficiency indicated by the relative difference in the required deployment density between two system solutions. The BEFC provides an upper bound on fiber cost per AP to make tight cooperation more economic than loose cooperation. When the actual fiber cost per AP is larger than the BEFC, the system with advanced coordination does not yield a cost benefit even with its superb performance. The zero value of BEFC suggests that the tight cooperation cannot be economic regardless of fiber cost due to too high equipment cost C t r . BEFC is quantitatively shown in Fig. 5 according to wall loss at a given traffic demand. When wall loss is small, the tight cooperation provides more technical gain by cancelling a significant amount of interference. Thus, h(l) becomes large so that tight cooperation is preferred for given C fiber . Nevertheless, closed environments with higher wall loss do not bring about total cost benefit by tight cooperation. In this situation, a more sophisticated system may not be desirable due to the marginal performance benefit compared to the fiber investment.
FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS
Although substantial work has to be done to realize affordable high-capacity provisioning, research on the design of local operator networks in shared spectrum is still in its early stage. In the following, we suggest high-level research areas to be addressed.
TRADE-OFF BETWEEN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF COORDINATION
Various levels of intra-/inter-network coordination result in different system performance as well as coordination costs. Therefore, the quantitative comparison of different forms of coordination needs to be done to identify the most viable coordination strategy. The main tasks are categorizing relevant information to be shared and quantifying network performance in various local environments. Performance improvement by coordination can be converted into cost saving in terms of the reduced number of APs. Then operators can examine if this compensates for the associated coordination cost.
IMPACT OF NETWORK SEPARATION
Indoor and hotspot networks will be located close to each other, particularly in dense urban districts, inflicting mutual interference. However, they are usually separated by walls and geographic distance. Their internetwork interference can be outweighed by intra-network interference if the separation between the networks is large enough. This means that the benefit of internetwork coordination relies on network separation, which requires thorough investigation. We scratched the surface in [15] .
ASYMMETRY BETWEEN OPERATORS IN A DEMAND AND DEPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENT
It is likely that nearby networks have different user demands, QoS requirements, or in-building propagation conditions. Such asymmetry in demand and physical environments may lead to unequal incentives or even negative cooperation gain to one of the participants. Moreover, finding a proper common objective function for the cooperation is a challenging task, especially when the partners aim at different QoS requirements specific to local services.
MULTITUDE OF INTERFERING NETWORKS/COOPERATION PARTNERS
It is common that a multi-story building accommodates several networks. At the same time, the building is surrounded by multiple neighboring buildings. Thus, the number of networks generating interference can be substantial. As the number of potential cooperation partners increases, the performance gain would be higher since more interference could be controlled. However, it would come at the expense of inflating business complexity. Therefore, the relation between cooperation incentive and the number of involved partners needs to be further explored.
IMPACT ON EXISTING MNOS
As more investments are made by local operators, subscribers of existing MNOs can have more opportunities to enjoy high-speed access. Such investments indirectly relieve the soaring traffic burden in wide area networks owned by MNOs. In addition, new local infrastructure can be shared by MNOs via roaming agreements. This can provide MNOs with competitive advantages over other competitors. While most of the literature focuses on the technical performance of a single operator's heterogeneous network, the impact of local operators on existing MNOs has to be studied further in both the technical and business domains.
CONCLUSION
We have proposed an analysis framework to explore the trade-off between performance benefits of operator cooperation in shared spectrum and involved technical and strategic costs. The key application in mind has been indoor wireless access networks that could potentially offload wide area cellular networks. In this framework, the implications of various operators' strategic decisions to cooperate or compete, and the related costs of internetwork coordination level are explicitly modeled. We have also validated our framework by showing a quantitative analysis example in which we compare the total cost of the candidate deployment strategies. Future research challenges involve assessing different operator strategies in various business situations and physical environments by using the frame- work, with the objective of finding the strategy that provides the lowest cost satisfying performance requirements.
